Litigation Funding Overview - United Kingdom

Emily O'Neill [1]

Overview

The litigation funding market in England and Wales is one of the most mature in the world.

Estimates of the size of the market in the UK in 2023 range from £1.5 billion to £4.5 billion.

Based on our own research, we believe these amounts represent the addressable market and that the amounts effectively deployed are probably a fraction of this.[2] 

All reports agree that the market has grown significantly in the past year.

Growth Predictions

In 2022, PWC UK predicted growth at a compound annual growth rate of 8.7 per cent over the next five years – from £2.2 billion in 2023 to £3.7 billion by 2028.[3] Sources cite a number of factors as causing that growth, including:

1. the increasing cost and complexity of litigation;
2. the increasing awareness of litigation funding among companies and individuals;
3. the increasing availability of funding from institutional investors interested in investing in alternative asset classes;
4. the need for businesses to free up working capital; and
5. the innovation in the litigation funding market introducing new funding models and structures.
   
   

Market development

Over the past five years, there has been a range of new entrants to the market, from private investors to hedge funds and family offices.

However, this year, the socio-economic environment has had a significant impact on the UK economy with the effects of Brexit, the Russia–Ukraine war, the aftermath of covid and governmental policy all coalescing to create a volatile environment with high inflation and rising interest rates.

Raising finance against this backdrop is more challenging than in the past few years and the increase in interest rates means that investors have opportunities to achieve target levels of return on their capital in lower risk investments.

In addition, the decision in PACCAR[4] has had an impact on the way in which litigation funding agreements in England and Wales are structured, and as such, extrapolating market size from reports predating July 2023 may not be reflective of the market going forward.

In the past year, there has been significant movement and volatility within the litigation funding market in England and Wales.[5] There are no conclusive reports as to why this has been the case but it is likely to be a combination of the factors outlined above.

As such, it is difficult to reach a data-based conclusion as to the specific level of funding activity, which remains active in the market in England and Wales today.

2023 year in review

The past year has been a turbulent year for the litigation finance industry in the UK.

As mentioned above, the PACCAR decision has meant that litigation funding agreements have had to be restructured to enable the funder to receive its capital back and return without reference to the benefit obtained by the claimant.

In addition, we have seen the first cases where funded parties are seeking to challenge funding agreements that were rendered unenforceable by PACCAR.[6]

The range of funding structures available has continued to rise, with an increased demand for law firm funding both for portfolios of cases as well as more generally from financiers who understand the legal industry.

The covid-19 pandemic is still having a significant impact on the UK court system, with delays making case durations longer.

However, it has also been reported that the insolvency market has returned to pre-pandemic levels following the end of the UK government's measures to suppress insolvencies during the pandemic.[7]

The number of group litigation cases being brought in England and Wales is continuing to increase, with a number of opt-out actions in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) having been certified in the past year as well as Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 19.8 representative actions and group litigation orders having been commenced with funders actively working to structure PACCAR-compliant agreements.

Insurance providers are offering a wider variety of products from capital protection, work in progress protection, own costs cover to judgment preservation insurance.

In addition, more insurers are entering the market.

However, although the range of products available is offering more choice to litigants, the increased size of the litigation insurance market does not yet seem to have reduced premiums, which can still be relatively high.

Legal and regulatory framework - United Kingdom

Historically, English law prohibited arrangements where litigation was funded or 'maintained' by third parties based on public policy grounds.

Champerty & Maintenance

The doctrines of champerty and maintenance date back to the Middle Ages and were designed to curb the power of English barons who were increasingly using their wealth and power to influence the legal system in their favour.

They were introduced as a remedy against the assignment of weak or fraudulent claims to wealthy people on the assumption that the assignee would be more successful in prosecuting the claim and would receive a share of the damages recovered.

Champerty and maintenance were seen as ways to prevent the English barons from abusing their power in this way and to ensure that everyone had access to justice, regardless of their wealth or status.

Champerty and maintenance were formally codified in The Maintenance and Embracery Act 1540, which made it a criminal offence to provide financial or other assistance to someone who was involved in litigation, unless the person providing assistance had a legitimate interest in the outcome of the case.

These doctrines were designed to help maintain order and stability within the English legal system.

Champerty, an aggravated form of maintenance, was defined by Lord Fletcher Moulton LJ in 1908 in British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v. Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [8] as

'a bargain with a stranger to a suit whereby that stranger agrees to champion or maintain the suit in return for a share of the proceeds if the suit is successful'.

Maintenance involved providing financial or other assistance to someone who was involved in litigation, without having a legitimate interest in the outcome of the case and where the assistance was provided without excuse.

This could include paying the litigant's living expenses or providing legal representation.

Maintenance was seen as problematic because it could give the person providing assistance too much control over the litigation, and it could also lead to corruption and bribery.

Champerty was where the financing party provided funding in exchange for a share of the proceeds if the lawsuit was successful.

This was considered to be improper as it foresaw a risk that it could lead to the third party taking control of the litigation. These doctrines were somewhat controversial, with some arguing that they were too restrictive and that they prevented people from bringing legitimate claims.

Others argued that they were unfair because they disproportionately affected the poor and vulnerable. Despite these criticisms, the doctrines of champerty and maintenance remained in force for over 400 years.

In the 20th century, the concerns that had led to the introduction of champerty and maintenance began to diminish.

Frivolous and vexatious litigation was no longer as much of a problem, and there were better safeguards in place to prevent corruption and bribery. Until the 1960s, champerty and maintenance were broadly defined and strictly enforced.

In 1960, in Westminster Bank Ltd v. Kennedy,[9] Lord Denning distinguished between champertous agreements and those that served a legitimate purpose, such as providing access to justice for those unable to afford legal costs. He argued that these doctrines were no longer necessary to protect the justice system, and that they were actually preventing people from accessing justice.

Lord Denning distinguished between legitimate third-party funding arrangements and those that genuinely sought to exploit the legal system, and in doing so introduced a more nuanced approach.

The Criminal Law Act

The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were abolished in England and Wales in 1967 by the Criminal Law Act. Although Sections 13 and 14 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 abolished the crimes and torts of maintenance and champerty, Section 14(2) left intact the rule that a contract which breached the rule against maintenance and champerty would be contrary to public policy and unenforceable.

Therefore, although champerty and maintenance were abolished as legal doctrines in England and Wales in 1967, Lord Fletcher Moulton's definition[10] remains relevant in assessing the enforceability of third-party funding arrangements.

In making this assessment, Lord Denning emphasised the importance of assessing the specific circumstances of each case, considering factors such as the purpose of the funding, the relationship between the funder and the litigant, and the potential impact on the administration of justice.

By the 1980s, there was a shift in the focus of public policy relating to champerty and maintenance from the remedy against intermeddling in the litigation to supporting the use of funding to provide access to justice for those who could not afford to litigate. In Trendtex Trading Corp v. Credit Suisse, Lord Roskill observed:

[The] courts have adopted an infinitely more liberal attitude towards the supporting of litigation by a third party than had previously been the case.[11]

In November 2008, Lord Justice Jackson was tasked with conducting a wide-ranging review of the litigation costs regime with the objective of making recommendations to improve efficiency and recovery of costs.

Jackson LJ's report of December 2009 proposed widespread changes in commercial litigation, including the introduction of contingency fee arrangements.[12] Jackson's report concluded that third party funding was 'beneficial in that it promoted access to justice'.

Jackson LJ stated that:

There is no access to justice if parties cannot afford to bring meritorious claims or to defend unmeritorious claims. If civil justice is to be affordable, it is necessary . . . that methods of funding meritorious claims or defences be available to parties of limited means.

He set out five reasons for his conclusion:

1. Third party funding provides an additional means of funding litigation and, for some parties, the only means of funding litigation. Thus third-party funding promotes access to justice.
2. Although a successful claimant with third party funding foregoes a percentage of his damages, it is better for him to recover a substantial part of his damages than to recover nothing at all.
3. The use of third-party funding (unlike the use of conditional fee agreements ('CFAs')) does not impose additional financial burdens upon opposing parties.
4. Third-party funding will become even more important as a means of financing litigation if success fees under CFAs become irrecoverable.
5. Third-party funding tends to filter out unmeritorious cases, because funders will not take on the risk of such cases.[13]

In 2009, the litigation funding industry in England and Wales was still in its infancy. Jackson LJ considered whether third party funding should be regulated or subscribe to a voluntary code.

Jackson LJ noted that the general view among respondents to the phase II consultation carried out as part of his review were that there should be some kind of regulation, but respondents disagreed as to whether a voluntary code would be sufficient or whether there should be a statutory regulation.

The Law Society of England and Wales responded to the consultation and set out two key concerns:

1. The litigation funding agreement is likely to allow the funder to withdraw funding in circumstances which would be contrary to the client's interest or unreasonable.
2. There is no guarantee against the funder becoming insolvent, with all the consequences which would flow from that.

Jackson LJ's Final Report considered a draft voluntary code that had been developed by the Third Party Litigation Funders Association in conjunction with the Civil Justice Council (CJC).

He did not consider that the draft code adequately addressed the two key concerns outlined by the Law Society.

The CJC then opened a consultation on its proposed Self Regulatory Code for Third Party Funding in June 2010 and a summary of responses was published in June 2011.[14]

Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders

The final version of the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders was published in November 2011.[15]

It was also agreed that the Association of Litigation Funders of England and Wales (ALF) should be established as the industry self-regulatory body.

The ALF is an independent body that has been charged by the Ministry of Justice with delivering self-regulation of litigation funding in England and Wales.

The ALF Code of Conduct (the Code) sets the standard for all litigation funders operating in England and Wales. ALF membership is voluntary for litigation funders and the ALF does not have the power to sanction non-members for breaches of the Code.

Article 2 of the Code addresses the key concerns identified by Jackson LJ and the Law Society in that a funder member of the ALF must have:

access to funds immediately within its control including within a corporate parent or subsidiary ('Funders Subsidiary'), or acts as the exclusive investment advisor to an entity or entities, which has access to funds immediately within its or their control including within a corporate parent or subsidiary ('Associated Entity'), such funds being invested pursuant to a Litigation Funding Agreement ('LFA') to enable a Litigant to meet the costs (including pre-action) of resolving disputes by:

1. receiving a share of the proceeds if the claim is successful (as defined in the LFA); and
2. not seeking any payment from the Funded Party in excess of the amount of the proceeds of the dispute that is being funded, unless the Funded Party is in material breach of the provisions of the LFA.

Jackson endorsed that parties could continue to be free to take out after-the-event (ATE) insurance to mitigate adverse party cost risk.

However, where the ATE policy is entered into on or after 1 April 2013, the ATE insurance premium would no longer be recoverable from the other side irrespective of whether the case is won or lost.

i The Consumer Credit Act

The Consumer Credit Act 1974 may apply to litigation funding where the finance is structured as a loan to an individual litigant.

Regulated credit agreements under the Consumer Credit Act are defined as agreements under which a creditor provides a borrower with credit and the borrower agrees to repay the credit and any other charges. Repayments can be made in one or more instalments.

Non-recourse litigation funding agreements, where the funder receives its capital back and return only in the event of success from the damages awarded, are unlikely to be classified as regulated credit agreements as repayment is only a contingent liability for the litigant.

ii Regulated activities

In general, litigation funding in England and Wales is not a regulated financial services activity under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). However, there are some specific activities and claim types that are regulated activities under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (RAO).

If the funder is carrying out these activities, it would need to be authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority.

These regulated activities include specific claims management activities as well as if the funder is acting as a fund manager where the funder is carrying on the activities by way of a business. Authorisation would be required by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) for each activity that the funder carries out.

A funder falls within the scope of the RAO if it is constituted under the laws of England, Wales and Scotland or has individuals who are ordinarily resident or, if a company, is constituted in Great Britain.

In addition, the RAO covers the funder's activities where the funder is providing claims management services in respect of a claimant or potential claimant who is ordinarily resident or if a company is constituted in Great Britain.

The regulated activities under the RAO are:

1. Seeking out, referrals and identification of (regulated) claims or potential claims; and
2. advice, investigation or representation in relation to (regulated claim types).[16]

The regulated claim types are:

1. a personal injury claim;
2. a financial services or financial product claim;
3. a housing disrepair claim;
4. a claim for a specified benefit;
5. a criminal injury claim; or
6. an employment related claim.[17]

All other claim types do not fall within the scope of the RAO, so funders who seek out or identify out-of-scope claims will not require authorisation by the FCA. In addition, purely providing funding in respect of regulated claim types does not require the funder to be authorised by the FCA.

Only where a funder is carrying out regulated activities in respect of regulated claim types would it be required to be authorised by the FCA.

Structuring the funding agreement

This chapter has considered the litigation funding market in England and Wales and the variety of products that are available. A wide range of structures are available and in use for funding litigation. The type of investment structure will have an impact on the funding agreement.

Given that the doctrines of maintenance and champerty are still applied when considering the enforceability of the LFA, funding agreements must take into account the factors the court will consider in assessing whether a funding agreement is contrary to public policy, as given below.

1. Does the funder have a legitimate interest in the outcome of the litigation?
2. Is the funder exerting undue influence over the litigation?
3. Is the funding arrangement fair and reasonable to the litigant?

Until July 2023, the standard business model employed by most funders (i.e., taking the higher of a percentage of the damages or a fixed multiple of funding drawn down[18] for a single-case commercial litigation funding) has remained relatively consistent.

PACCAR

On 26 July 2023, the Supreme Court ruled (in a majority four-to-one decision) in the PACCAR case that litigation funding agreements that specify the return to the funder by reference to the benefit obtained by the claimant are classified as damages-based agreements (DBAs) under Section 58AA(3) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (CLSA). DBAs must comply with the requirements of the DBA Regulations.

It was common ground that the litigation funding agreements in issue were not compliant with the DBA Regulations 2013, and as such were held to be unenforceable.

The PACCAR decision arose in the context of an application for a collective proceedings order (CPO) in the CAT in an action against truck manufacturers to recover excess purchase costs incurred by their customers arising out of a cartel to fix the prices of trucks sold.

To obtain a CPO, applicants must show that they have adequate funding arrangements in place.

The defendant truck manufacturers challenged the litigation funding agreements as being unenforceable DBAs under Section 58AA(3) of the CLSA.

Under Section 58AA(3)(a):

a damages-based agreement is an agreement between a person providing advocacy services, litigation services or claims management services and the recipient of those services which provides that –

1. the recipient is to make a payment to the person providing the services if the recipient obtains a specified financial benefit in connection with the matter in relation to which the services are provided, and
2. the amount of that payment is to be determined by reference to the amount of the financial benefit obtained;

Section 58AA(7) states that 'claims management services' 'has the same meaning as in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (see Section 419A of that Act)'. Section 419A of the FSMA states:

1. In this Act 'claims management services' means advice or other services in relation to the making of a claim.
2. In subsection (1) 'other services' includes–

(a) financial services or assistance'

The Supreme Court held that the litigation funding agreements relied on by the claimants were DBAs and were unenforceable as not meeting the requirements of the DBA Regulations.

However, even if the litigation funding agreements had been compliant DBAs, Section 47C(8) of the Competition Act 1998 provides that DBAs are unenforceable in opt-out collective proceedings before the CAT.

Given that opt-out proceedings in the CAT require litigation funding to bring the claim, the CAT has taken a practical approach to managing the impact of PACCAR on the cases before it. In September 2023, in Gutmann v. Apple,[19 ]the CAT was informed that Mr Gutmann had not yet finalised a new funding agreement following the PACCAR decision.

However, on 1 November 2023, the CAT certified Mr Gutmann's claim to proceed on the condition that suitable updates to the funding agreement are put in place to provide an enforceable funding agreement.

On 21 November 2023, the CAT certified the Neil v. Sony[20 ]case to proceed, approving the funding agreement in place. The LFA provided that the funder would receive the higher of either a multiple of its costs limit or a percentage of the damages 'only to the extent enforceable and permitted by applicable law'.

The CAT held that the LFA including this wording was not an unenforceable DBA.

The CAT also rejected Sony's arguments that the claim amount available to the funder from which to take its return acted as a cap, and so recovery from those damages would be by reference to the financial benefit obtained by the claimant.

The CAT held that the reference must be to the amount of the financial benefit obtained. It also considered that the wording in the LFA that 'any provision of this agreement which begins with the words “only to the extent enforceable and permitted by applicable law”' could be severed if required.

The CAT considered that the LFA would remain valid as 'the removal of the unenforceable provision does not so change the character of the contract that it becomes “not the sort of contract that the parties entered into at all”'.[21]

The Department for Business and Trade has also addressed the PACCAR decision. On 31 August 2023, it issued a statement:

The Department is aware of the Supreme Court decision in Paccar and is looking at all available options to bring clarity to all interested parties.

On 15 November 2023, the UK government proposed an amendment to Section 47C CA in the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill to delete reference to 'claims management services'. This would mean that funders would not be performing claims management services and so their LFAs would not fall within the definition of a DBA under Section 58AA(3)(a) of the CLSA.

The proposed amendments will address funders in the CAT but will mean that funding agreements outside the CAT remain unenforceable where the funder's return is calculated as a percentage of the damages received by the claimant.

Disclosure

In general, there is no requirement to disclose litigation funding agreements in the Courts of England and Wales. However, there are a couple of exceptions to this general rule:

1. Where the other party makes an application for security for its costs under CPR25.14, the court will undertake an assessment of the litigant's ability to pay those costs. Where the litigant is does not appear to have the means to fund the case itself, the court may order disclosure of the funding arrangements in order to confirm that the arrangements are adequate to ensure that the litigant can pay any costs order awarded against it. The courts have the inherent power to order disclosure of the identity and address of a third party funder, and that the third party confirm whether it had contributed or agreed to contribute to the claimant's costs in return for a share of any money or property recovered. However, the court has no inherent power to order the disclosure of the agreement between the claimant and the third-party funder before a security for costs application is made.
   
   
2. Litigation funding agreements are required to be disclosed in the context of collective actions. The court or tribunal has a duty to ensure that the arrangements agreed with the class representative are reasonable and in the interests of all class members as well as ensuring that any adverse costs award can be paid by the class representative before ordering that the case can proceed.

In addition, a litigant may wish to voluntarily disclose that it is funded to demonstrate to the other party that it has a strong case and that its claim has been assessed by a third party.

Costs

Part 44 of the CPR sets out the general rules about costs. Pursuant to Section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court has discretion to award costs to one party or another and to establish the timing of that payment and the amount of the costs to be paid.

However, the general position is that the unsuccessful party will be required to pay the costs of the successful party but the court may make a different order.

The fact that a party has entered into a damages-based agreement will not affect the making of any order for costs that otherwise would be made in favour of that party. [22]

Under CPR 46.2, the court also has discretion as to whether to order costs against a third party such as a funder.

If the court is minded to make a third party costs order, the funder would be added to the proceedings as a party to the costs proceedings and would be given the opportunity to attend a hearing where the court would consider the matter.

Security for costs is a factor that is frequently raised by defendants in funded cases. The courts have held that ATE policies can be sufficient to evidence that the litigant can satisfy a costs order awarded against it and would not require the litigant to provide security by payment of monies into court.

The court must assess whether the ATE insurance is 'sufficient protection', which requires the court to evaluate the risk of the company being unable to pay the costs notwithstanding the insurance.[23] In making that assessment, the court needs to satisfy itself that, in the ATE, there are no insurance policy terms pursuant to which the insurers can readily but legitimately and contractually avoid liability to make payment of the defendant's costs.

This requires the court to form a view at this stage on (1) the meaning of the policy, and (2) on how readily it may be avoided legitimately and contractually, and (3) to form a view of the likelihood of circumstances arising which will enable the policy to be readily, legitimately and contractually avoided.[24]

The court has accepted a suitable anti-avoidance endorsement alongside the ATE insurance policy as sufficient to provide security for the defendant's costs.[25]

Until recently, there had been a long-standing principle that any costs award made against a litigation funder would be limited to its contribution to the case (the 'Arkin Cap').[26]

However, in Davy v. Money,[27] the court departed from the Arkin Cap because the court considered that the funder was implicit with the claimant in elements of the case, parts of which led to an indemnity costs order.

In addition, the court considered that the funder was due to receive more than the claimant in the event of success. The court did confirm that the funder would not be liable for costs incurred prior to it entering into the funding agreement as there needed to be a causal link between the funder and the costs claimed.

Following the Jackson review, from 1 April 2013, parties are no longer able to recover costs simply because they are reasonably and necessarily incurred. Costs incurred on or after 1 April 2013 must be 'proportionate' to the matters in issue in the claim (except for cases commenced before 1 April 2013, when the proportionality test does not apply).

This means that courts are required to deal with cases justly, at proportionate cost (i.e., in ways that are proportionate to the amount of money involved), considering the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues and the financial position of each party. On 1 October 2023, a new fixed costs regime was introduced in England and Wales. This is unlikely to impact funders as it applies only to claims of less than £100,000.

Outlook and conclusions

There remains strong demand for litigation funding in England and Wales.

The decisions of the English courts, together with the statements made and actions that have been taken by the UK government and courts to clarify the system following PACCAR, suggest that England and Wales remains a favourable market for investment in litigation funding.

This in turn will maintain the growth and development of available litigation funding products.

Footnotes

1 Emily O'Neill is a general counsel at Deminor.

2 PWC, https://omnibridgeway.com/docs/default-source/insights/regulation/class-action-centre/litigation-funding---final-pwc-report---march-2020.pdf?sfvrsn=6f7cc6ec_7; Grand View Research, https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/legal-services-market; Research & Markets, https://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/5234755/global-litigation-investment-funding-market.

3 Strategy&, UK Legal Services Market Report 2022, PwC UK, https://www.pwc.co.uk/industries/assets/uk-legal-services-market-report-2022.pdf.

4 R (on the application of PACCAR Inc and others) (Appellants) v. Competition Appeal Tribunal and others (Respondents) [2023] UKSC 28.

5 'Losses grow at litigation funder despite higher revenue', Law Gazette, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/losses-grow-at-litigation-funder-despite-higher-revenue/5117949.article; 'UK Litigation Funder Augusta's Employees Bolt for Omni Bridgeway', bloomberglaw.com, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/uk-litigation-funder-augustas-employees-bolt-for-omni-bridgeway; 'Listed firm sells litigation finance business to pay off debts', News, Law Gazette, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/listed-firm-sells-litigation-finance-business-to-pay-off-debts/5116635.article.

6 Therium Litigation Funding A IC v. Bugsby Property LLC [2023] EWHC 2627 (Comm).

7 Manolete Partners Plc interim financial statements, 30 September 2023.

8 [1908] 1 KB 1006.

9 [1960] 2 All ER 466.

10 British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v. Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006.

11 [1982] A.C. 679 at 702; [1981] 3 W.L.R. 766.

12 Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report, https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/jackson-final-report-140110.pdf.

13 id., Chapter 11. Third Party Funding.

14 Third Party Funding - Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, https://www.judiciary.uk/related-offices-and-bodies/advisory-bodies/cjc/previous-work/costs-funding-and-third-party-funding/third-party-funding-2/.

15 https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/CJC/Publications/CJC+papers/CJC+News+Release+-+Code+of+Conduct+for+Litigant+Funders.pdf.

16 S.89G RAO.

17 s.89H–89M RAO.

18 Multiples can also be calculated based on a multiple of capital committed but this is less usual than using capital deployed as the base number.

19 Mr Justin Gutmann v. Apple Inc., Apple Distribution International Limited, and Apple Retail UK Limited https://www.catribunal.org.uk/sites/cat/files/2023-11/14687722%20Mr%20Justin%20Gutmann%20v%20Apple%20Inc.%2C%20Apple%20Distribution%20International%20Limited%2C%20and%20Apple%20Retail%20UK%20Limited%20-%20Judgment%20%28CPO%20Application%29%20%201%20Nov%202023.pdf.

20 Alex Neill Class Representative Limited v. Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Limited; Sony Interactive Entertainment Network Europe Limited; and Sony Interactive Entertainment UK Limited https://www.catribunal.org.uk/sites/cat/files/2023-11/15277722%20Alex%20Neill%20Class%20Representative%20Limited%20v%20Sony%20Interactive%20Entertainment%20Europe%20Limited%3B%20Sony%20Interactive%20Entertainment%20Network%20Europe%20Limited%3B%20and%20Sony%20Interactive%20Entertainment%20UK%20Limited%20-%20Jud_0.pdf.

21 Tillman v. Egon Zehnder Ltd [2019] UKSC 32.

22 CPR 44.18.

23 Premier Motor Auctions Ltd (in Liquidation) v. PwC & Lloyds [2017] EWCA Civ 1872.

24 Saxon Woods Investments Ltd Francesco Costa and others [2023] EWHC 850 (Ch).

25 Saxon Woods Investments Ltd Francesco Costa and others [2023] EWHC 850 (Ch).

26 Arkin Borchard Lines Ltd (Nos 2 and 3) [2005] 1 WLR 3055.

27 Davey Money & Ors [2019] EWHC 997 (Ch).